Skip to main content
Decision Assurance is the contract MeshQu offers a regulator, auditor, or counterparty: given a downloaded artifact and the right out-of-band public keys, you can independently prove what decision was made, under which policy, against which evidence, by which actor, at what externally-verifiable time — without trusting MeshQu’s live database or dashboard.
MeshQu is in early access — no customer is running production traffic against MeshQu yet. The statuses below describe what is implemented and verifiable in our pre-GA deployments.

​
Maturity model

​
Trust roots — the load-bearing rule

Every signature in a Decision Receipt and Verification Bundle is verified against an out-of-band trust root. The bundle’s own trusted_keys.json is informational — useful for fingerprint UIs — but never used to authenticate a signature. Otherwise, a self-signed bundle (operator-controlled keys listed as “trusted” in the bundle) would pass verification.

​
What an offline verifier proves today

See Verification Bundle for the full sub-claim taxonomy and failure codes.

​
What still requires trusting MeshQu

  • MeshQu’s signing-private-key custody.
  • The authenticity of the out-of-band public-key distribution channel (we publish via JWKS and bundle defaults; you can pin fingerprints).
  • That DecisionContext.evidence references and source_artifact hashes the caller submits are truthful — we hash what we’re given.

​
What a privileged DB operator can and cannot do

MeshQu enforces immutability at the storage layer:
  • Deleting a recorded receipt or policy snapshot is blocked.
  • Updating any integrity-bound field is blocked. The only legitimate post-record mutation is result.transparency_anchor (the async-Rekor patch path).
  • Forging a new receipt still requires the signing key. Rekor anchoring
    • future external-attestor signatures (L5) are the next layer.

​
Roadmap

P1 (in flight):
  • Receipt-v2 envelope — bind canonical snapshot digest, evidence manifest digest, and approval receipt digest into the signed integrity_hash. Closes the policy_versions informational gap. Dual-hash migration window: v1 receipts continue verifying forever.
  • Evidence Manifest v1 — first-class evidence artifact: multi-item, optionally signed by external custodians.
  • Policy Approval Receipts — cryptographic ratification receipts; ratifier-signed.
P2: AI provenance envelope · RFC 3161 timestamps · multi-log transparency · counterfactual replay · RFC 8785 / canonical-v1.

​
See also